Essay on Intelligence, Democracy, and the War in Iraq

Iraq and its confrontations with the world is still one of the main international problems faced by global community. After the US interventions in Iraq, there was a great shift in democratization processes and global security. In spite of these changes, global community seems to be little doubt that Iraq carried out research and development on the production of chemical and biological agents, and nuclear weapons.

Help With Essay On Intelligence, Democracy, and the War in Iraq

Help With Essay On Intelligence, Democracy, and the War in Iraq

In general, Iraq was not the first country which used chemical forces. During the civil war in Egypt 1967-1968, its military applied chemical weapons against civil population. After the Suez conflict (1956), both Egypt and Syria had developed chemical and nuclear weapons. The next country was Israel which began development of nuclear weapons during 1950s. Also, Israel announced building a nuclear reactor in Dimona in 1960. Iraq has begun a nuclear program only in 1980s when the threat of war became apparent. Most of the countries, including Russia and Chila are accused in supplying specific CW munitions. The Socialist Party of Chile reportedly issued a communique from its 24th congress in June 1984, charging that Chile was shipping “chemical bombs” to Iraq as part of a $30 million air consignment. Further, referring to the UN report of Spanish markings, Cardoen claimed that all of the equipment that it had shipped to Iraq bore instructions only in Arabic and English. Similar to other countries, China, Iran and Afghanistan, Iraq develops weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological agents, and probably nuclear weapons (Bengio 2002).

Today, political interests in the Middle East have nothing to gain from further substantiation of Iraq’s perfectly legal chemical production when Iraq already stands convicted in international eyes of the illegal use of warfare chemicals. The criminal trials of export control violators in Europe reveal only fragmentary information, although the legal cases would be stronger if the equipment sales could be tied to specific plants. The facts state that: “Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions, which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve gas” (Chemical Weapons Found in Iraq, 2006). Previous results state that, an Iraqi-backed terrorist group modifies the valves on a Japanese remote-controlled, crop-spraying helicopter, which has been imported legally for agricultural purposes (Beckett 2005).

The following three -Samarra, Fallujah, Akashat — are most prominent as alleged production facilities and will be discussed in greater detail, followed by more tenuous cases. Samawah and Salman Pak are also probably among the prime five suspected facilities, although neither is a significant production site. They will not be discussed further, however, because the complete public information is contained in the several references above. Speculation about a large “new” or “undiscovered” nerve agent plant is discussed with the Al-Fallujah material since many of the allegations locate it there. News reports state that: “In 2004, the US army said it had found a shell containing sarin gas and another shell containing mustard gas, and a Pentagon official said at the time the discovery showed there were likely more” (Hundreds of chemical weapons, 2006).

In nuclear proliferation is likely to lead it to increase its efforts to acquire and deploy biological weapons of similar lethality. Chemical weapons are far less lethal than biological and nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons may confer more status in terms of perceived lethality, but biological weapons can be as–or more–lethal than the kind of nuclear weapon that Iraq is likely to acquire during the next decade. Finally, developments in Iraq will interact with the strengths and weaknesses of other proliferators. Current research state that with the possible exception of Israel, no Middle Eastern ruling elite is likely to develop a good understanding of the strategic consequences of using weapons of mass destruction, the operational effectiveness and reliability of weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to accurately assess the damage inflicted on an opponent or retaliatory damage (Mauroni 2003). A combination of the ongoing regional arms race and US counter-proliferation efforts may make some of these uncertainties even worse. The uncertain survivability of weapons, delivery systems, and C4I/BM capabilities may encourage most regional proliferators to consider preemption, launch on warning, launch under attack, and sudden moves to high levels of escalation. The risks inherent in overt attacks may encourage covert and unconventional attacks and/or the use of terrorist and extremist proxies. Further, all or none or these pressures may affect behavior in a given crisis, and strategic predictability is likely to prove a dangerous fantasy (Krasno, Sutterlin, 2003).

UNSCOM has deprived Iraq of most of its inventory of chemical and biological shells and rockets, and of its large-scale production capabilities. Time alone would make many of Iraq’s shells and rockets useless because of the poor purity of their chemical agent. As a result, it may be some time before Iraq achieves a significant breakout capability in using such weapons once UN controls are lifted. Iraq also seems likely to give longer-range systems priority as long as its resources are limited, or it must keep them covert, because this has higher political priority. There is, however, no hard information to confirm Iraq’s claims to UNSCOM that it has actually destroyed its inventories of biologically armed shells and rockets. Iraq had so many chemical rounds before UNSCOM began its efforts, that it may retain enough rounds for at least one major engagement. There are also 550 155 mm artillery shells filled with mustard gas that Iraq has claimed were destroyed during the war, but for which it has never provided any supporting evidence Further, UNSCOM cannot possibly hope to detect a covert program designed to purify Iraq’s agents and make them more storable, improve the lethality of the agent, and improve the fusing and dispersal of its warheads. Iraq also has had more than half a decade in which to improve its artillery organization and training, as well as aspects of its C4I/SR system that would improve its ability to use chemical and biological rounds. The unclassified data available on Iraq’s holdings of multiple rocket launchers are too contradictory to make a precise estimate of wartime losses, but it is clear that many such weapons were destroyed or abandoned in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. However, Iraq seems to retain around 120 such weapons. It also seems to retain many of its pre-war holdings of the FROG surface-to-surface rocket launchers, and at least several hundred rockets, etc.

The main advantage of current democratic processes is that they allow liberalization of trade and political participation, grant women a right to vote and increase freedom of speech. Still, the organization of authority on the basis of democracy in Iraq is connected with difficulties: the necessity of the majority of citizens’ participation, compulsion of decision-making, etc. By virtue of these reasons democracy in Iraq does not exist in its “pure” type.

The main instrument and originator of democratic change in Iraq is the state. Every country in the region has developed its own form of government, and all of them have made social engineering a primary objective. In every country, the edifice of the state looms over society, seeking not only to govern but also to regulate and direct the behaviors, thoughts, and actions of its citizenry. Equally important, though less widely recognized, is that one’s actual political views are not always openly expressed (Terrill 2005). Particularly in repressive, nondemocratic polities, there is a stark difference between one’s “regime orientations,” or perceptions of the specific political personalities and establishments in power, and one’s “political orientations,” or broader feelings about politics. Given the nature of politics in Iraq and the ways in which states and societies have interacted, this distinction is especially significant (Moore, 2004). And while democrats account for much of the popular social and cultural views toward politics in the Iraq, it is hardly a political force elsewhere in the region. But one can find such ubiquitous, culturally based political features as Islam, personalities striving to become deities, nationalism, and an amorphous, loosely articulated (though changeable) affinity to the Palestinians. In Iraq, Islam has, therefore, come to shape much of the political culture becoming an integral facet of people’s perception of politics. It is for many the blueprint for escape from the corruption and drudgery of contemporary politics. It provides clear and ready answers for the debilitating dilemmas that plague society, answers that are both resonant and compelling. Its resonance and extreme devotional features account for Islam’s political success.

The main ‘cons’ against democracy in Iraq include different cultural and national traditions. Islam has a great impact on all aspects of culture determining social and political traditions of the state. Democracy contradicts with norms and values of Islam forcing citizens to change their century-old tradition and rituals. According to position of Bengio (2002) Islamic Republics such as Iraq – they assume forms which have little attraction for the inhabitants of industrial societies, and indeed may actually be incompatible with such societies in the long run. Clearly not all states are ‘liberal’ in the foreseeable future, but it does seem likely that most of the major centers of power in the world fits this description, while those that do not will be illiberal in an unsystematic way rather than offering a conscious alternative to the prevailing political form. It does make some kind of sense to talk of the triumph of Western liberalism. The experts Juan Cole and Larry Diamond (2006) underline that ideological differences create the main conflict between western liberalism and eastern traditions, and resulted in rejection of democratization processes. They suppose that: “Democracy isn’t possible in Iraq in the next few years,” he acknowledged, “but maybe we can avoid a civil war. Stabilization is the most important goal. This can be achieved by winding down the Sunni insurgency” (Twair, Twair 2006).

This in turn led to the second group of factors which contradicts with the democratization processes. In Iraq, leader’s personal powers as the state’s authority became concentrated within the individual ruler, political institutions were not allowed to grow autonomously. Power became increasingly personalized, legitimated not so much institutionally or culturally as by reliance on patronage and charisma. In the absence of established institutions or principles, boastfulness and self-aggrandizement became a matter of political necessity, tricking down through the system as a safeguard against the arbitrariness and absolutism at the top. Traditionally, the cult of personality, therefore, was often the most apparent manifestation of the leader’s might, in essence representing the fragility of the institutions through which he ruled. Political Islam for them is still untested and untried, and they have no reason to expect anything other than its complete success if it should win official power. In Iraq, political Islam continues to grow ever more powerful, its strength reinforced by deteriorating economic and political realities, on the one hand, and popular longing and disillusionment, on the other. Islam is now a force to be reckoned with–indeed, the only force. “Some researchers maintain that from the outset there had existed an affinity with Islam too strong to allow for a truly secular approach” (Bengio 2002, p. 176).

In sum, the war is over but there are a lot of problems which have not been solved yet. Iraq needs to look further than the cornerstone of its own tradition, for Islam was itself a most progressive phenomenon. Political changes support democratic changes through complicated international political affairs and the emergence of new ideological challenges. In some respects, this intellectual rediscovery of Islam predates its rebirth at the popular, mass level, thus laying a theoretical framework within which Islam and political action were later synthesized.

Works Cited Page
1. Beckett, I.F.W. Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective. Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, 1-21.
2. Bengio, O. Saddam’s Word: The Political Discourse in Iraq. Oxford University Press, 2002.
3. Chemical Weapons found in Iraq. Friday, June 23, 2006. Available at:,2933,200726,00.html
4. Hundreds of chemical weapons found in Iraq: US intelligence. 2006. Available at:
5. Krasno, J.E., Sutterlin, S.J. United Nations and Iraq: Defanging the Viper. Praeger, 2003.
6. Mauroni, A. Chemical Demilitarization: Public Policy Aspects. Praeger, 2003.
7. Moore, M. Bush’s War for Reelection: Iraq, the White House, and the People. Wiley, 2004
8. Twair, T., Twair, S. Experts See Little Hope for Emergence of Democracy in Iraq. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. 25, April 2006, 52
9. Terrill, A. Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p. 14-19. is a provider of high quality, custom writing services and can write any kind of paper, including case studies. is experienced in writing informative, detailed, and concise case studies on any subject and using either kind of case study approaches. If you need help with a case study, place your order for a case study and one of our professional writers will happily construct a case study for you or help you with any other writing assignment you may have: Essay, Research Paper, Thesis, Term Paper, etc.

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